BBC News – 6 March 2013
French President Francois Hollande has said his country will begin withdrawing troops from Mali next month. He said the final phase of military intervention would continue throughout March and be scaled down in April.
Read the entire article here.
CCI ANALYSIS: Last week CCI completed site surveys, risk assessments and training programs for workers displaced by the fighting in Mali. Although the timetable reported in this BBC article for the withdrawal of French forces from Mali is faster than expected, the consequences of this withdrawal remain predictable. As French forces are replaced by an African peace-keeping force (whether that force is UN-led or not), we can expect to see a less robust campaign against AQIM and other rebel forces in Mali.
AQIM’s capabilities in Mali have been degraded by the French intervention, and it will take time for those capabilities to be re-built. If the Malian and supporting military forces demonstrate both competence and commitment, the AQIM rebuilding will be slower and less complete. However, AQIM and its “member franchises” (those smaller, Islamist terrorist groups that affiliate with al Qaeda principles and philosophy but who operate independently) will retain an intent to commit terrorist attacks in Mali.
After the French forces depart, we can expect to see AQIM attempt to reassert its influence in the region. This will involve an ongoing guerrilla warfare campaign against Malian and other military forces, but it will also involve terrorist attacks against non-combatant, “soft targets”. CCI expects to see these terrorist attacks occur primarily in two locations: The first will be along a “line” that will generally separate government-controlled territory in the southern, more populated part of the country and AQIM-dominated territory, generally in the less-populated northern part of the country. It is too early to know where this “line” may be. However, CCI expects that generally, Malian forces will retain primary control and security in Niono, Mopti and areas south of those cities. We anticipate that Gao will be the site of ongoing conflict between government and AQIM forces. The road between Mopti and Gao will likely see attacks. AQIM will, from time to time, attack south of this “line” to attempt to show that the government cannot protect that region.
CCI also expects that AQIM will commit terrorist attacks in Bamako and perhaps other southern cities. These attacks will most likely be sporadic and fairly infrequent. They will, however, be attacks designed to inflict maximum impact and generate maximum media attention. As such, they will focus on “soft targets”. These targets will include places where large numbers of people assemble (shopping districts, transportation centers, etc.). They may well also include Christian targets. Boko Haram, which has at least claimed to be participating with AQIM in Mali, mounted an aggressive campaign of suicide VBIED (vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, or car/truck bombs) against churches in Nigeria. Whether AQIM forces in Mali will replicate that tactic or conduct other high-casualty attacks against Christian targets in Mali remains to be seen. But faith-based organizations working in Mali need to recognize that they are potential targets of AQIM attacks and prepare accordingly.
With these words of caution, CCI also encourages readers to place this emerging threat in perspective. Although terrorism and terrorist attacks are generally new to Mali, they are certainly not unprecedented and the risks in Mali will remain significantly lower than in countries such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Libya – all places where faith-based organizations are able to continue their operations while taking appropriate security and risk management measures.
Faith-based organizations should be using this window of time to build their own security capacity:
1. Security and contingency plans should be reviewed, updated and all personnel should be familiar with them.
2. Evacuation plans should be reviewed and updated. All personnel should be prepared for precautionary evacuations (probably through Bamako and then by commercial air carriers) and for overland evacuations, including to neighboring countries.
3. Sources of security and risk information should be cultivated and relationships with key personnel nurtured. Networks of like-minded organizations intentionally sharing risks and security information are strongly encouraged.
4. Communications protocols with all remote venues should be strengthened. Very strong consideration should be given to deploying satellite phones to all remote venues and teams (as well as to headquarters/central offices, whether in Bamako or elsewhere).
Faith-based organizations working in Mali with specific questions or needing additional advice may contact CCI directly (tel (+1) 805.642.2549; email info@cricon.org).